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I.

INTRODUCTION

The opening sentence of Respondent Farm Bureau's response brief states, "This case asks
the Court to decide whether an intentional criminal act of pointing a gun and shooting another
person can ever be considered an 'accident' covered by insurance." Respondent's Brief, p. 1. The
answer to the query posed by the Respondent is yes, an intentional act to which an Alford plea was
entered by the uninsured third-party can constitute an "accident" from the perspective of an
unsuspecting, insured landowner. As demonstrated below, the district court erred by applying
flawed Idaho precedent, and in so doing propagated a hazardous standard that this Court must
correct.
Throughout its response brief, Farm Bureau attempts to limit this Court from focusing on
the true underlying issue at bar: that by allowing Farm Bureau to refuse policy coverage to the
Cooks for Stanczak' s claims, the district court applied a precedent that hurts not just the Cooks,
but all insured Idaho citizens who own property in Idaho. Any prior Idaho court precedent to the
contrary should be overturned because the dangerous pattern that the district court adopted from
the Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox 1 and State Farm v. Doe 2 cases is inconsistent with Idaho
premises liability law, and would leave the Cooks and other unsuspecting Idaho property owners
exposed to liability for the unforeseen intentional acts of others, despite paying for premises
liability coverage. Thus, this Court must overturn the lower court's decision and correct the
coverage loophole created by the application of the Wilcox and Doe decisions to the present case.

1 Mut.

2

ofEnumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4,843 P.2d 154 (1992).
State Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693,946 P.2d 1333 (1997).
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II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Introduction.

In its response brief, Respondent Farm Bureau argues that the district court did not err in
applying Idaho precedent (which Farm Bureau terms the "causation" test) and finding no coverage
for Joseph Stanczak's claims against the Cooks. Farm Bureau also contends even if the district
court erred and a "perspective of the insured" test is applied, Stanczak's claims against the Cooks
are barred under the business activities, intentional act, and violation of criminal law exclusions of
the Policy. For the reasons shown below, Farm Bureau's arguments are without merit, and the
Court should reverse the district court's summary judgment ruling.

B.

The Wilcox and Doe Cases Created Harmful Precedent.

Farm Bureau argues that this Court should not analyze the Chisholm-Stanczak shooting
from the insureds' perspective, but should instead view coverage based on the nature of the act
causing injury. In so asserting, Farm Bureau focuses on the Wilcox and Doe decisions cited by the
lower court, and argues that the "causation test" (i.e., reviewing coverage based on the act causing
the injury) adopted by Wilcox and applied by Doe controls. Farm Bureau maintains the "causation
test" should remain the appropriate standard in Idaho as opposed to the "perspective of the
insureds" test asserted by Appellants and followed by other jurisdictions.
In the opening brief, the Cooks discussed at length why the Wilcox and Doe decisions
revolve around facts dissimilar to the present case, and also why the Wilcox court's reasoning
behind its adoption of the "causation test" is ambiguous and confusing, thus leading to the district
court's error. However, it merits reiteration here that not only did the Wilcox and Doe decisions
create confusion and ambiguity, but they also produced a harmful precedent that exposes Idaho
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landowners to uncovered civil liability for the intentional acts of a third-party on their property.
While the Wilcox court purported to focus on the conduct of the insured, Mrs. Wilcox, in its
coverage analysis, its sudden adoption of the "causation test" in the second to last paragraph of the
decision created a loophole by which insurers can deny liability coverage to the insured based on
conduct by someone other than the insured even though the insured remains liable for the thirdparty conduct. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159.
The "causation test" cases Farm Bureau cites from other jurisdictions (as well as Wilcox
and Doe themselves) exhibit precisely the type of unexpected exposure that this Court can
eliminate on behalf of Idaho insureds by adopting the "perspective of the insured" test. A review
of the underlying facts of several of these cases uncovers an alarming array of situations in which
an unsuspecting landowner, like the Cooks, could be found without insurance coverage but still
liable under applicable negligence laws for the intentional acts of another:

•

Mut. of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992) (ex-husband of
insured sexually abused day-care children on insured's property);

•

State Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693,946 P.2d 1333 (1997) (son of insureds sexually
molested daycare child on insureds' property);

•

Allstate Ins. Co v. JJM, 254 Mich. App. 418,657 N.W.2d 181 (2002) (minor partygoer molested another minor partygoer while at insured's home);

•

Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cornwell, 1202 Nev. 303, 90 P.3d 978 (2004) (insureds' adult
son sexually seduced minor neighbor);

•

Offeaus v. Guthrie, 746 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (insureds' minor son
murdered neighbor);

•

Allstate v. Hill, 2005 WL 1959560 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (insured's roommate shot
acquaintance during altercation at home where insured and roommate lived);

•

Miller v. Allstate, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (insured's husband
molested the couple's grandchildren);
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•

UnitedNat'llns. Co. v.Entm'tGrp.,Inc.,945F.2d210(7thCir.1991)(minorchild
sexually assaulted in washroom of insured's movie theater);

•

Hermitage Ins. Co. v. Dahms, 842 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. 111. 1994) (bar patron
assaulted other patron both inside and outside the insured's bar);

•

Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 77 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 1996) (no
coverage for insured mother whose son participated in the gang-related death of
another boy);

•

Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (insured school
bus owner's employee bus driver molested children on bus);

•

Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kienenberger, 257 Mont. 1360, 847 P.2d 1360
(1993) (adult woman raped by insureds' minor son);

•

Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Co Fat Lee, 439 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2006) (no coverage
for insureds whose son closed garage door and left car running with son and
passengers inside, resulting in passengers' deaths); and

•

Hunt v. Capital Indem. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (bar patron
stabbed and killed by other patrons outside of insured's bar).

While each of the above-listed cases deals with heartbreaking circumstances in which one
person intentionally injured and even killed another, what is also alarming is that the unsuspecting
insureds in each case were found to have no coverage for the injuries because the injuries were
intentionally caused on their property by a third-party, despite pending liability claims against the
insureds by the victims. Based on the diverse range of unexpected3 occurrences shown above, the
"causation test" adopted in the Wilcox case and further applied in Doe creates broad exposure on
behalf of not just a select group of Idaho citizens, but all insured Idaho landowners, including
parents, roommates, and even small business owners.
Respondent states that "[b]ecause Idaho law is settled, the Court need not consider other
jurisdictions that apply the perspective of the insured test." Respondent's Brief, p. 35. Yet when

3

Unexpected and without intention or design by the insured. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159.
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the "settled" law creates exposure for unanticipated liability for a large percentage of insured
Idahoans, the Court has a duty to review such law - and considering the precedent of other
jurisdictions4 is well within the Court's discretion when doing so. Since this Court adopted the
"causation test" in Wilcox, this Court likewise has the ability to overrule Wilcox and adopt the
"perspective of the insured" test in light of the clear harm to which the "causation test" exposes
unwary Idaho landowners who carry liability insurance.

C.

The "Causation Test" is Inconsistent with Idaho Premises Liability Law.

Farm Bureau alleges in its brief that Stanczak "attempted to manufacture coverage by
alleging separate allegations of negligence against the insureds, the Cooks." Respondent's Brief,
p. 22; see also id, p. 16. This assertion is baseless and assumes facts never presented as evidence.
Stanczak's claims against the Cooks in his lawsuit do not attempt to "manufacture coverage," but
are consistent with Idaho negligence law under which the Cooks, as landowners, could be found
to share responsibility for Stanczak's injuries.
Under Idaho law, the duty that owners and possessors ofland owe to a land entrant depends
on whether the entrant is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. A licensee is a visitor who goes upon
the premises of another with the consent of the landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. The
duty toward a licensee is such that a landowner is required to share knowledge of dangerous
conditions or activities on the land with the licensee. Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,401, 732 P.2d
369, 370 (Ct. App. 1987). The landowner also owes a duty to a licensee to avoid willfully or

Such precedent, as cited in Appellants' Opening Brief, might include: Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher,
140 F.3d 222 (3rd Cir. 1998) ((quoting Mohn v. American Cas. Co. ofReading, 458 Pa. 576,326 A.2d 346,348
(1974) ("[T]he fact that the event causing [bodily injury or damage to property] may be traceable to an intentional
act of a third party does not preclude the occurrence from being an 'accident.'")); and Westfield Ins. Co. v. Tech Dry,
Inc., 336 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2003) (insured's negligent hiring and retaining of former employee who murdered
customer was a qualifying "occurrence" under the policy; the court found that the insured's conduct and actions must
be evaluated, not those of the perpetrator of the intentional act).
4
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wantonly injuring him, and to refrain from exposing him to dangerous instrumentalities on the
premises which are unknown to the licensee. Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649,652,671
P.2d 1112, 1115 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593,691 P.2d 1208 (1984).
Stanczak was a licensee on the Cooks property the night Chisholm shot him. Stanczak
entered onto the Cooks' property at Bloom Lake pursuant to his own purpose of fishing and
camping and enjoying the lake. R p. 288. The Cooks did not charge a fee for Stanczak or other
campers to use the property, and the Cooks received no benefit from Stanczak's visit. R pp. 68,
142, 196, 357, 368, 401. Therefore, under Idaho law the Cooks owed Stanczak a duty to share
knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land, avoid willfully or wantonly injuring
him, and avoid exposing him to dangerous instrumentalities on the premises. Evans, 112 Idaho at
401, 732 P.2d at 370; Keller, 105 Idaho at 652, 671 P.2d at 1115.
The Cooks could be found in breach of this duty by exposing Stanczak to a dangerous and
violent individual, Michael Chisholm, with multiple firearms in his possession (which he stored in
the Cooks' caretaker cabin). Stanczak has alleged that, as the owners of the property, the Cooks
should have known of this dangerous condition on their land. R p. 288. In contrast, Stanczak did
not know of this condition, and was unable to take precautions for his own safety. Id. Mr.
Chisholm's intentional actions resulted in Stanczak's injuries. R pp. 290, 297, 300-02. Thus, the
Cooks' breach of their duty to Stanczak was the proximate cause of Stanczak' s injuries.
In 1992, when the Wilcox court handed down its decision adopting the "causation test"
instead of what Respondent calls the "perspective of the insured" test, the court unwittingly created
a massive liability potential for the average insured Idaho property owner, including the Cooks.
As noted above, Idaho premises liability law holds a landowner accountable for not sharing
knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land with a licensee or otherwise exposing
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the licensee to dangerous instrumentalities on the premises. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at
370; Keller, 105 Idaho at 652, 671 P.2d at 1115. This liability remains even when the landowner
did not intend for the licensee to be injured. Therefore, in order to protect themselves from
premises liability, Idaho landowners purchase liability coverage from insurers such as Farm
Bureau. Yet application of the "causation test" by the Wilcox court, the Doe court, and the district
court here has allowed insurers to avoid covering the very types of unexpected incidents and
liability that insureds like the Cooks intend to cover when purchasing liability insurance.
This in tum exposes Idahoans, including the Cooks, to uncovered personal liability for
what from their standpoint (and under the definition adopted in Wilcox 5) was an "accident" and
therefore an "occurrence." The average Idaho landowner is unlikely to understand that their insurer
will deny coverage, thanks to Wilcox and Doe. And since insurers are certainly more able to be
aware of this loophole than their insureds, they have the upper hand over insureds in drafting their
insurance policies to exclude such coverage.
As such, this Court must overturn the lower court's decision, as refraining to do so not only
leaves the Cooks exposed, but perpetuates the lack of coverage of other insured Idaho landowners
as well.

D.

Appellants' Public Policy Argument is not an "Empty Plea."

In its response, Farm Bureau contends that the Appellants "make an empty plea that to
'hold there is no coverage under the Policy for Stanczak's claims against the Cooks would in
essence expose all insureds [sic] citizens ofldaho to personal liability under similar circumstances
.... "' Respondent's Brief, p. 36 (quoting Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 23). As shown above,

5

Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159.
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Appellants' public policy argument is certainly not an empty plea, but a demonstration to this
Court of the great harm that exists in Idaho with respect to civil liability not covered by insurance.
Respondent further states:
Farm Bureau asserts that the way the law is in Idaho helps its citizens because it
allows insurance companies to better assess their risk so that appropriate premiums
rates can be set. The holding advocated by the Cooks would significantly hinder
insurance companies' ability to assess that risk and the multitudes of scenarios that
would arise relating to insurance coverage for certain intentional torts or criminal
actions. Public policy arguments cannot enlarge the agreements between insureds
and insurers. The Cooks' public policy arguments can also be rejected.
Respondent's Brief, p. 36. What Farm Bureau neglects to point out to the Court is that the current
state of the law requires a potentially insured Idaho citizen to perform the very type of complex
risk assessment that Farm Bureau believes insurance companies would be hindered from doing
under the "perspective of the insured" test. Why are Idaho citizens better-able to perform such a
risk analysis than insurers (who would certainly have better access to data related to potential
claims and scenarios of intentional torts and criminal actions)? Farm Bureau does not expound
upon this assertion other than to imply that an insurer and insured are on the same playing field
when entering into insurance agreements. Such reasoning is clearly flawed and self-serving, and
this Court should not be deceived by it.

E.

The Business Activities Exclusion is not Applicable Here.

In its response brief, Farm Bureau seeks to have the judgment for reasons presented in the
summary judgment, but not relied upon by the trial court. Farm Bureau contends that even if
Wilcox and Doe were overturned, the Policy's business activities exclusion would exclude

coverage for the Cooks' claim. Respondent's Brief, p. 36.
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Farm Bureau is incorrect, and misreads the explicit language of its own policy. The Policy
defines "business" as:
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity,
engaged in for compensation, other than farming or custom farming. Business
Includes rental of all or any part of an Insured location to others, or held for rental
by you, other than:

1. Your residence premises if rented occasionally;
2. Garages, if not more than three car spaces are rented;
3. One-, two-, three-, or four-family dwellings described In the Declarations; or
4. Yourfarm.
R p. 96 (emphasis in original).
In its brief, Respondent attempts to show that the Cooks operated a business at Bloom
Lake, arguing that they engaged in an activity for compensation at the premises. Farm Bureau
argues the Cooks received compensation for services to campers by soliciting donations from
campers in order to cover the cost of infrastructure. Respondent's Brief, pp. 37-38. Yet MerriamWebster defines "donation" as:
1 : the making of a gift esp. to a charity
2 : a free contribution : GIFT
THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY at 155 (1995) (Note: this is the entire definition provided).
How can a gift or free contribution be a form of compensation? Insinuating that the receipt of
donations at a campground is somehow the receipt of compensation is a flawed argument, and
would therefore imply that clothing donations to charity thrift stores are also the receipt of
compensation by the store. The Court should therefore disregard Farm Bureau's poorly-supported
assertion.
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Furthermore, an insured's farm is not a business under the Policy (see above), which
explicitly defines "farming" as
the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the raising or keeping of livestock,
fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small mammals primarily for
fur production. It Includes wholesale but not retail sales, except incidental retail
sales of your unprocessed farm products with the resulting gross income being less
than 25% of your combined farming gross income.
R p. 97 (emphasis added; emphasis in original omitted). One of the reasons Stanczak was at Bloom
Lake on the evening in question was to catch fish. R p. 288. By keeping fish in the lake on their
property, the Cooks clearly fall within the farming exception to a business activity under the
Policy. The business activities exclusion therefore is inapplicable to Stanczak's claims against the
Cooks.
It is also important to note that any pre-discovery, unilateral assumption made by Stanczak

regarding the supposed business structure of Bloom Lake (e.g., by including the phrase "d/b/a
Bloom Lake Campground" in his Complaint, which was subsequently amended to omit this
designation6) carries no weight with respect to the actual business structure, or lack thereof, of the
Cooks' Bloom Lake property. It is puzzling why Respondent Farm Bureau would place this
irrelevant subject before the Court other than to divert it from the true matter at hand. Respondent's
Brief, p. 38 fn. 5.

F.

The Intentional Act Exclusion is not Applicable Here.

Farm Bureau also asserts that the intentional act exclusion of the Policy would exclude
coverage of Stanczak's claims against the Cooks. Respondent's Brief, pp. 1, 16, 40-41. The Court
should note that the Cooks have at no time stated or alleged that Chisholm was their agent or an

6

See R p. 295.
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insured under the Policy, contrary to Farm Bureau's insinuations. See Respondent's Brief, pp. 3941. The intentional act exclusion states:
SECTION II EXCLUSIONS
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II except Coverage
M. Section II does not cover bodily injury or property damage:

***
3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion does not apply to
the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect a person or property; ....
R p. 45 (emphasis in original).
Chisholm is not an insured under the Policy. R p. 23; Respondent's Brief, pp. 4, 10. Thus,
the intentional act exclusion does not apply to his actions, but only to the actions of the insureds,
the Cooks. R p. 45. The Cooks have at no point acknowledged any involvement in Chisholm's
intentional shooting of Stanczak, nor is there evidence in the record of any such involvement by
the Cooks. Therefore, the insured Cooks did not intentionally cause the alleged bodily injury, and
the intentional act exclusion is irrelevant to the case at bar.

G.

The Violation of Criminal Law Exclusion is not Applicable Here.

Farm Bureau also argues that the criminal act exclusion of the Policy would exclude
coverage of Stanczak's claims against the Cooks. Respondent's Brief, pp. 1, 6, 10, 16, 41. The
analysis of this erroneous assertion is identical to that for an intentional act under Section F. above.
The criminal act exclusion states:
SECTION II EXCLUSIONS
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II except Coverage
M. Section II does not cover bodily injury or property damage:

***
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14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law, Youth Rehabilitation Act, or similar
law, except traffic violations, if committed by any insured; ....
R pp. 45-46 (emphasis in original).
Again, Chisholm is not an insured under the Policy. R p. 23; Respondent's Brief, pp. 4, 10.
The Cooks have never stated or alleged that Chisholm was their agent or an insured, which
Respondent acknowledges. See Respondent's Brief, p. 39. Thus, like the intentional act exclusion,
the criminal act exclusion does not apply to Chisholm's actions, but only to the actions of the
insureds, the Cooks. The insured Cooks did not violate a criminal law, and were not criminally
charged or prosecuted for Stanczak's injuries. Therefore, the criminal act exclusion is also
irrelevant to the present matter.

H. Farm Bureau is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees.
The Respondent argues that it is entitled to attorney fees because "the Cooks merely repeat
the same arguments they made below, asking the Court to set aside clearly binding Idaho law
without any supporting justification ...." Respondent's Brief, p. 42. This statement is incorrect
and self-serving. Regarding the award of attorney fees, this Court has previously stated:
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1, a party may be subject to sanctions if an
appeal is brought frivolously and without foundation. "Under IAR Rule 11.1,
sanctions will be awarded on appeal if the party requesting them proves: (1) the
other party's arguments are not well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law, or
made in good faith, and (2) the claims were brought for an improper purpose, such
as unnecessary delay or increase in the costs of litigation." Frank v. Bunker Hill
Co., 142 Idaho 126, 124 P.3d 1002, 1008 (2005) (citing Painter, 138 Idaho at 315,
63 P.3d at 441).
Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 51, 156 P.3d 545, 552 (2007). As the Appellants' briefing shows,

the Cooks are clearly justified and reasonable in seeking the guidance of this Court with respect to
the dangerous coverage loophole created by the Wilcox and Doe cases. The Cooks have more than
adequately demonstrated the foundation upon which they have appealed the district court's ruling.
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The Cooks' supporting arguments are made in good faith and are grounded in the facts shown
above, and were not brought frivolously or for an unnecessary purpose. Therefore, Farm Bureau
is not entitled to fees should it prevail.

III.

CONCLUSION

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. For the
reasons set forth in this appeal, the trial court's summary judgment should be reversed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of October, 2017.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

Attorneys for Appellants/Defendants Cook
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of October, 2017, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of
record as follows:
James L. Martin
Tyler J. Anderson
Benjamin C. Ritchie
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 W. Main St., Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF: 14

!Kl
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

